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BOOK REVIEW
SHARING THE WORLD'S RESOURCES. By Oscar Schachter.
New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. Pp. 172. $7.95.
Reviewed by Gidon Gottlieb*
In his stimulating book, Oscar Schachter gives us a thoughtful analysis
of the complex principles of justice and equity being developed by the
community of nations for sharing the world's resources. The scope of his
work is bold: he examines ocean space, water basins and rivers, and, to
some extent, the atmosphere and the general environment, as well as problems of exchange and transfer of goods and services. In a path-breaking
chapter, he considers the pricing of raw materials, monopolistic and oligopolistic restraints, the transfer of technology and the relocation of industry, the
regulation of multinational companies and foreign investors, and the responsibility to prevent famine and malnutrition. In his analysis of the current
demands for a more equitable economic order, he studies the idea of "just
prices" and its relationship to the classic economist's notion of the market
price.
Schachter demonstrates that the sharing of world resources should
involve more than considerations of economic gain and bargaining. It is
bound in the profoundest sense with ideas of morality and justice. This
arises, he claims, from the necessities of contemporary international relations
since states are often driven to enter into cooperative arrangements to
safeguard their economies, sustain domestic growth and development, and
compete for their share of the world's wealth. He argues that states facing
this task must have "a basic agreement or shared conception of principle for
the distribution of benefits and burdens . . . .Without such agreement, it
becomes virtually impossible for governments with divergent interests to
maintain continuing cooperation and a stable association." (P. 143). It is
this requirement that "provides the basis for the application of standards of
equity in international decisions. The ideal of distributive justice may thus
be seen as grounded in the rocky soil of international conflict and the felt
necessities of collaboration." (P. 143).
He also demonstrates how the idea of distributive justice can be given
determinate content and political weight in the process of claim, bargaining,
and negotiation. Schachter does not prescribe or recommend-he guides the
reader through the maze of international arrangements on entitlements and
competing claims. But he stops well short of overstating his thesis-he does
not argue that we are at long last likely to achieve distributive justice among
nations.
* Leo Spitz Professor of International Law and Diplomacy, University of Chicago. LL.B.
1954, London School of Economics; LL.B. 1956, Cambridge; LL.M. 1957, Harvard University;
Diploma in Comparative Law 1958, Cambridge; J.S.D. 1962, Harvard University.
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The strength of the argument lies in the abundant and consistently
important illustrations from the practice of states. In the best tradition of
legal scholarship, his argument is anchored in specific situations and references. This is a tradition that requires patient inquiry of the "living law," of
the way in which law is used and developed in society, of the practices,
claims, and demands which harden into accepted norms and standards.
Three questions arise about Schachter's thesis on which his views are
not disclosed. First, what is the proper weight to be assigned to considerations of interest and power in the practice of states where the sharing of
resources is concerned? Schachter's intimate knowledge of the U.N. system
disposes him to emphasize states' verbal behavior. In the economic area, as
in other fields of international concern, the language of principle and right
has come to displace the language of interest and power.1 This may be an
unavoidable feature of public parliamentary diplomacy which hardly lends
itself to the rhetoric of give-and-take. Use of the language of principle and
right, of the language of claims of entitlement and distributive justice, signals
moreover a rejection by the dominant coalition in the United Nations of
economic relations based upon market principles and the free play of economic forces. The advocacy of managed economic relations in the international arena mirrors the authoritarian economic "dirigisme" of the great
majority of states. The market system is rejected both domestically and
internationally. The new order which they advocate is conceived instead in
terms of claims of entitlement, distributive justice, just prices, and equality.
Yet the contrast between international verbal behavior, in the legalisticmoralistic mode, and the actual practice of states anchored in power is
everywhere to be seen. International demands for a new international
economic order made themselves felt in earnest only after the oil boycott of
1973 and the OPEC cartel's successful price increases. Substantive economic
bargains are not shaped in public diplomatic assemblies. Accords on questions affecting currency, prices and levels of oil production, arms deals, and
investments are struck in more discreet settings. These are later reflected in
the protracted processes of multilateral negotiations which often merely
formalize private agreements. Considerations of justice and equity do not
often structure the outcome of such bargains. The fact that agreements
might be couched in the language of high principle does not demonstrate
that high principle was the guiding factor. What is still needed is a proposed
demarcation of the proper spheres of the self-interest principles on which
economic bargaining theories of negotiation are founded and of the principles
of justice and law which dominate Schachter's interpretation. It is difficult to
conceive at this time how this demarcation can be achieved. Legal analysis
will have to take account of theories of the bargaining process like those of
Zeuthen and Harsanyi that entirely disregard any concept of norm or prin1. For an analysis of bargaining from these perspectives, see the collection of essays in
BARonAomn,
FoamrA THoumS oF NEGOT-TION (0. Young ed. 1975).
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ciple. Nevertheless, Schachter's fundamental thesis that sustained cooperative
relations do require a broad, shared, normative structure is well borne out by
the ample evidence he produces.
The second question is whether considerations of justice and equity
import demands for the scrutiny of the domestic behavior of states, for the
assessment of their human rights performance. The ideological rejection of
economic relations based upon power interests and the "invisible hand" has
a dialectic force of its own. Once standards of justice and equity are pressed
to govern the sharing of world resources, it becomes increasingly difficult to
resist their use in assessing the domestic behavior of regimes whose record
on economic rights, not to speak of civil and political rights, is ambiguous at
best. Once claims of justice are pressed in the international economic area,
it remains to be seen how long it will be possible to contain international
concern for the realization of these rights domestically. At present, the
principles of nonintervention in the domestic affairs of states and of the
sovereign independence and equality of states are invoked to resist such
international concern. The connection between principles of distributive
justice and respect for human rights, even for societies in which economic
rights are asserted to take precedence over political rights, is latent in the
perception that no just internationaleconomic order is possible so long as it
is dominated by unjust domestic societies. The United States Congress is
already committed to provide safeguards against the possibility that authoritarian governments which deprive their citizens of basic political and human
liberties divert U.S. assistance from its intended purposes or use such assistance to bolster their repressive regimes. 2 The connection between human
rights and -the international order is asserted in article 28 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights itself.a
The third question, which requires considerable delicacy, is whether the
ideals of distributive justice and of equity can be promoted by cooperation
with tyrannical and corrupt regimes. In other words, the world's resources
should be shared, but with whom? Are we talking about equality for states
or for the people within them? The new states' claims to remain free from
intervention must be given considerable weight if only because the colonial
period was not marked by impressive advances in the conditions of colonial
peoples. The need for a candid appraisal of economic cooperation with the
less palatable regimes remains. Tact and imagination are required to share
resources effectively with the most deprived peoples of the planet who, to
compound their misery, are often afflicted by repressive governments. No
principle of justice would be compatible with a failure to distribute the
benefits of the world's economy to the least developed countries on account
of the political conditions in those countries. The problem is not one of
principle but of effectiveness. One can hope that Professor Schachter will
share his thoughts on these matters with his readers.
2. See 22 U.S.C. § 2151n(a) (1976); H. REP. No. 406, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 34-35 (1975).
3. "Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized."
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The deep shift to a legalistic-moralistic mode in bargaining over world
resources is tied to the prominence of human rights questions which are at
the core of legalistic-moralistic discourse in international affairs. The link
between the principles of distributive justice and respect for human rights is
a measure of the authenticity of the demands advanced in the name of
justice. This link affirms that economic changes demanded by developing
countries must be carried out for the benefit of their populations, that justice
is not for "states" but for their inhabitants. Governments with a reputation
for repressive and corrupt rule are active claimants for international justice.
By and large, such governments have demonstrated little concern with claims
of justice, distributive or otherwise, in their own societies. They press
demands internationally which they neglect domestically. A reaction must be
expected. Robert Tucker has even contemplated the possibility that some
might demand intervention against any government that failed to use trans4
ferred wealth for the benefit of the worst off.
Reports are coming from newly wealthy countries like Venezuela and
Indonesia that the new oil revenues are benefiting only a narrow class.
Development has meant a deepening gap between the masses and the new
privileged classes. It has also meant inflation and exorbitant prices for
necessities. Principles of distributive justice invoked internationally can
result in deepening inequalities domestically. There are very few instances
in which repressive or corrupt rule has enhanced the economic conditions
of the peoples so ruled. Western elites share with the South's leaders the
rejection of the present inequalities of income, wealth, and power. But
Western sensibilities weighted by guilt for colonialism and racism continue
to exhibit tolerance for the worst excesses of the South's rulers. Western
elites give these rulers credit for attempts to manage their own societies in
their own way. Reference is frequently made to the West's own tortuous
and lengthy path to respect for human rights and social welfare. Atonement
for the brutality of earlier generations, rather than a genuine commitment to
the effective improvement of the fate of the destitute masses of the Third
World, appears to inform prevailing Western elite attitudes. A genuine
commitment to the principles of distributive justice would require greater
concern for the filtering down of transferred wealth and resources.
Throughout the book, Schachter has resisted the temptation to engage
in philosophical arguments. Despite notable contributions by Gary Runciman and John Rawls, 5 theories of distributive justice offer little guidance for
the treatment of deprived groups. Under American law, the equal protection
principle is now argued to warrant favored treatment for the most disadvantaged groups in society. In international relations, the analogous principle would require special measures in favor of the least developed countries.
Justice for groups remains a difficult question for philosophers and diplomats
4. Tucker, Egalitarianismand International Politics, 40 CowparNARY, Sept 1975, at 27-40.
5. 1. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusTicE (1971); G. RuNcmAN, RmA=m D.PRIVATION AND
SocIAL Iusncs (1966).
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alike. In a perceptive review of some of the Rawlsian literature, Robert
Amdur summarized the state of the art rather simply, "Rawls has little to
say about relations between societies . .
Concerning the distribution of
wealth among nations, A Theory Of Justice says nothing at all." 0
This is precisely where Oscar Schachter's work is a major contribution
to the theory of justice. Characteristically, he goes about making his points
unassumingly and with great precision. The product is a rare and valuable
blend of general principles and detailed particularity. He is able to refute
the overly pessimistic view, which enjoys a certain vogue today, that a
minimal consensus on the principles of distributive justice is
nowhere in
sight.7 He demonstrates-where others argue-how international moral
obligations are developed and accepted. The peculiar mix of moral normative
principles relating to needs and entitlement and their applicability, for
example, in doctrines about permanent sovereignty over natural resources,
does not lead to a prescription for a master order of values for all situations.
On the contrary "[i]n our pluralistic and heterongeneous world such a
master order would be neither sensible nor feasible. What we might reasonably expect and seek to promote is a more sustained effort to identify and
clarify the multiple goals shared by most peoples and to relate these goals to
specific situations and proposed actions." (P. 33). And he adds, "A process
of concretization should occur so that diverse situations may be distinguished
for purposes of ordering priorities and goals." (P. 33). He suggests that
"[w]e can already see this in the special categories emerging for international
preferences-the desperately needy Fourth World, the underdeveloped but
financially prosperous oil producers, the landlocked countries, the desert
areas, the resource-poor industrialized countries and those threatened by
environmental damage.... " (P.33).
His concern with equity does not blind him to the other major goals of
states. We cannot escape from the reality of pluralist goals and the necessities of trade-offs and compromise.
This slender volume should be essential reading for a number of
audiences-those concerned with the world economy or with global bargaining, those interested in the theory of justice, and students of jurisprudence.
In an age in which a deluge of printed words reflects the narrowing of
specialization, it is a pleasure to recommend a book which makes a genuine
contribution to issues which no educated person can neglect.

6. Amdur, Rawls' Theory of Justice, Domestic and International Perspectives, 29 WORLD
PoLrnICS 438 (1977).
7. See, e.g., R. TUCKER, TH3 INEQuALrry oF NATIONS 177 (1977).

